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PUBLIC SERVICE LAW:
PRIVATIZATION’S UNEXPECTED
OFFSPRING
TONY PROSSER*
I
INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom was the pioneer, if not of privatization, of a large scale
privatization program extending to the public utilities: And it remains in the
forefront of attempts to introduce forms of the new public management using
private sector techniques in public administration.1  One might think that this
means that the role of public law, and of distinctive notions of public service
embodied in law, have disappeared in those areas where privatization has taken
place.  Indeed, this perceived decline in public service law is the characteristic
criticism of the British experience by commentators in Continental Europe.
The Conservative governments of the United Kingdom certainly intended to
replace hierarchical administrative controls with a marketplace in which resort
to the courts on public law matters would be unnecessary.2
In this article, however, I hope to suggest a paradox.  The United Kingdom
has experienced a new growth of public service law in relation to the privatized
utilities.  This has resulted in a convergence of the tradition of the United King-
dom and that of nations such as France and Italy, where public service has
played a central role in public law, due in part to a unique rhetoric of public
service in the Continental tradition.  Indeed, it could be argued that the regula-
tory reform that accompanied privatization has made possible the development
of a distinct discipline of public service law in the United Kingdom.3  In this ar-
ticle, I define public service law as law designed to make basic public services
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1. For examples of the massive literature on this subject, see M.E. BEESLEY, PRIVATIZATION,
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION (2d ed. 1997); COSMO GRAHAM & TONY PROSSER,
PRIVATIZING PUBLIC ENTERPRISES (1991); Michael J. Goldsmith & Edward C. Page, Farewell to the
British State?, in PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM 147 (Jan-Erik Lane ed., 1997).
2. For an insider’s view, see C.D. FOSTER, PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND THE
REGULATION OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 258-420 (1992).
3. For further discussion of public service law, see PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN
EUROPEAN UNION LAW (Mark Freedland & Silvana Sciarra eds., 1998); H.W. MacLauchlan, Public
Service Law and the New Public Management, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Michael
Taggart ed., 1997).  The Continental literature is, of course, enormous.  See, e.g., CONSEIL D’ETAT,
ÉTUDES ET DOCUMENTS NO. 46, RAPPORT PUBLIC 1994 (1995); RENAUD DENOIX DE SAINT MARC,
LE SERVICE PUBLIC (1996).
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available to all citizens without discrimination.  This may require modification
of the operation of markets and recognition of the need to compensate for sub-
stantive inequalities by providing services to the disadvantaged.  Thus, public
service law has both a descriptive and a normative dimension.  It is descriptive
in that it is concerned with goods and services provided by institutions between
the market and the state, which may include public enterprises at arm’s length
from government.  It is normative in the sense that it is based on egalitarian
rights derived from citizenship rather than an ability to bid in the marketplace.4
My discussion of the development of a discipline of public service law in the
United Kingdom will be limited to the privatization of public utilities.
II
THE ABSENCE OF A TRADITION OF PUBLIC SERVICE IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM
In marked contrast with their Continental neighbors, the British have tradi-
tionally been reluctant to enshrine requirements of public service in their sys-
tem of law.  During the nineteenth century, however, a relatively little-known
body of common law developed to ensure access to monopoly services and to
avoid discrimination in the way in which such access was provided.5  The best-
known of these cases concerned access to a dock monopoly,6 but other examples
included rights of access to ferries, bridges, and other early public utilities.7
These cases may represent an early attempt to develop competition law in the
interest of economic efficiency by minimizing market distortions created by
monopoly power.  Implications of this trend in the case law reached beyond
competition law, however.  And as Paul Craig has documented, the cases sug-
gest the recognition of some form of public property rights triggered by the pos-
sibility of restrictions on public access to essential, but privately owned, serv-
ices.8
These cases could have supported the establishment of principles concerned
with rights of equal access to public services, like those that developed in
France that are described below.  Indeed, in the United States, cases such as
Allnutt v. Inglis were influential in forming a basis for the constitutional accep-
tance of utility regulation. 9  In the United Kingdom, however, they were largely
forgotten, especially after the nationalization of the public utilities, culminating
in the statutes of the Labour Government in the late 1940s.  Certain nationaliza-
tion statutes included a number of provisions to protect users, such as the stat-
4. For a similar conception, see Mark Freedland, Law, Public Services and Citizenship—New
Domains, New Regimes, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 3, at
1.
5. See Paul P. Craig, Constitutions, Property and Regulation, 1991 PUB. L. 538.
6. See Allnutt v. Inglis, 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1810).
7. See Magistrates of Kircaldy v. Greig, 8 D. 1247 (Scot. 1846).
8. See Craig, supra note 5, at 542.
9. The seminal case is Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).  For a more detailed account, see
Craig, supra note 5, at 543-51.
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utes that required supply to be made available according to demand, and pro-
hibited undue discrimination against particular types of users.10  These statutes
thus reflected the concerns of the nineteenth-century cases.  However, these
provisions did not constitute any coherent pattern of consumer protection.  Fur-
thermore, they were vague and difficult to interpret, and could not form the ba-
sis for a corpus of public service law.11  Instead, the citizen’s recourse against de-
cisions of the public utilities was to be political rather than legal.12  This
approach proved to be remarkably ineffective, and was certainly incapable of
resisting attempts to make the nationalized industries behave like ordinary capi-
talist businesses in the later days of nationalization.13  The nationalized indus-
tries became notorious for poor customer relations, notably the ineffectiveness
of arrangements to protect vulnerable families from disconnection of essential
services.14  There was one major achievement under nationalization: the crea-
tion of an infrastructure to provide what is now termed “universal service”
throughout the United Kingdom.  There was no parallel development of legal
doctrines of public service, however, such as those that emerged in France.
Technological advances were seemingly not reflected in new legal conceptions
of citizenship.
At the time of privatization, British policymakers certainly had no intention
of embodying principles of public service in law; indeed, the British Govern-
ment was determined to avoid legal controls as much as possible.15  Some per-
ceived law as a way to facilitate meddling by courts, as well to create an unnec-
essary recourse to legal rights where market solutions would be more
appropriate.16  It would be a serious mistake to view the privatization process as
having ended the relevance of public service to the utilities, however.  Some-
what reluctantly, the British Government established new regulators for each
utility sector, initially with the aim of restraining monopoly until it could be re-
placed by competition.17  Nevertheless, political compromises had to be made,
and the legislation setting out the duties of ministers and of the new regulators
in relation to the public utilities contained a number of different duties mixing
economic and social rationales.18  For example, in all cases, meeting all reason-
10. See, e.g., T. Sharpe, Undue Price Discrimination and Undue Preference: A Legal Perspective, 2
CONSUMER POL’Y REV. 33 (1992).
11. See Terence Daintith, The United Kingdom, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN MIXED
ECONOMIES (Wolfgang Friedmann ed., 1974).  For the flexibility of the duties in practice, see South of
Scotland Electricity Board v. British Oxygen Co., 3 All E.R. 199 (1956).
12. For an overview of the problems, see TONY PROSSER AND PUBLIC CONTROL 194-221 (1986).
13. See id. at 36-74.
14. See id.; see also NATIONAL ECON. DEV. OFFICE, A STUDY OF UK NATIONALISED
INDUSTRIES (1976).
15. The seminal statement of this view of regulation is contained in the report commissioned from
an academic who later became a regulator of the electricity industry; that report formed the basis for
the price control system adopted for each utility.  See STEPHEN LITTLECHILD, REGULATION OF
BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROFITABILITY (1984); FOSTER, supra note 2.
16. See generally LITTLECHILD, supra note 15.
17. See id.
18. See generally TONY PROSSER, LAW AND THE REGULATORS 5-24 (1997).
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able consumer demands forms part of the legislative requirements, reflecting a
duty to provide a form of universal service.19  Legislators retained prohibitions
on undue preference or undue discrimination from the nationalization statutes,
and they included special duties requiring ministers and regulators to pay spe-
cial regard to the interests of consumers, especially those in rural areas, pen-
sioners, and the disabled.20  These by no means formed a general or consistent
body of public service law in themselves, but are nevertheless important in sug-
gesting that the utilities are different from other enterprises and that require-
ments based on social solidarity—to use the Continental phrase—are not irrele-
vant even after privatization.  These duties are now partially replaced by a new
duty in the Utilities Act 2000, which will be discussed in more detail after a de-
scription of the establishment and practice of the regulatory authorities.
III
THE INSTITUTION OF REGULATORY AGENCIES AND SOCIAL REGULATION
IN PRACTICE
New independent regulatory authorities were thus established for each of
the privatized utilities (telecommunications, water, rail, gas, and electricity).21
The British system, unlike others, vests legal powers for each sector directly in
Directors-General rather than in commissions, though they are assisted by
regulatory offices.  The regulatory offices are the Office of Telecommunica-
tions, the Office of Water Services, the Office of the Rail Regulator. the Office
of Gas Supply, and the Office of Electricity Regulation; the latter have merged
into the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, shortly to be renamed the Gas
and Electricity Markets Authority.22  Originally, these offices were to have lim-
ited importance, which would wither away with the growth of competition.  In-
stead, the regulators have now become a permanent and influential presence.23
The regulators’ main tasks have been to reset price controls for monopoly areas
of utility operation, and increasingly to act as specialist competition authorities
for those areas in which competition has been introduced, notably in telecom-
munications and the supply of gas and electricity.  This latter role increased in
importance in March 2000, when the regulators acquired the power to imple-
ment the reformed U.K. competition law in their respective sectors.24
19. See Telecommunications Act, 1984, § 3(1)(a) (U.K.); Gas Act, 1986, § 4(1)(a) (U.K.); Electric-
ity Act, 1989, § 3(1)(a) (U.K.); Water Industry Act, 1991, § 2(3)(a) (U.K.); Railways Act, 1993, §
4(1)(b) (U.K.).
20. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act, 1984, §§ 3(1)(a), 3(2)(a) (U.K.).
21. Those for gas and electricity have now been merged, and one regulatory authority has been
added for the postal service.  For details of the original authorities, see PROSSER, supra note 18.  The
arrangements for the postal service were announced in DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS., POST
OFFICE REFORM: A WORLD CLASS SERVICE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 1999, Cmnd. 4340 and are im-
plemented by the Postal Services Act, 2000, §§ 1-5 (U.K.).
22. See Utilities Act, 2000, §§ 1-8 (U.K.).
23. For the view of the regulators as essentially temporary controls on remaining areas of monop-
oly, see generally LITTLECHILD, supra note 15.
24. See Competition Act, 1998, § 54, & sched. 10 (U.K.).
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The regulators, however, have also treated some types of social regulation
designed to protect consumers as within their power.  All regulatory agencies
have established service standards, which encompass general quality of service
indicators as well as provide rights of compensation for individual consumers.25
Certain utilities have encountered particularized social regulatory develop-
ments.  In telecommunications, for example, one of the fears at the time of pri-
vatization was that the number of public phone booths would be drastically re-
duced, especially in rural and low-income areas.  To avoid this, complex
provisions were included in British Telecom’s license restricting the circum-
stances in which such phone booths could be closed.26  The regulator also
mounted a major campaign to ensure that the phones actually worked.  Compe-
tition has been permitted also in the provision of public phone booth services.
As a result of these developments, the number of phone booths increased con-
siderably, from under 80,000 in 1987 to about 140,000 now, although a decline in
their profitability due to the growth of mobile telephony is likely to lead to
price increases.27
The second area of regulation with a strong social dimension is that of spe-
cial tariffs for low users.  A low-user tariff emerged from discussions between
British Telecom and the regulator leading to the review of the Company’s
regulated tariffs in 1989.28  Proponents of the tariff justified it as maximizing the
value of the telephone network as a national resource by permitting as many
people as possible to be connected to it.29  Later versions of the scheme, how-
ever, were targeted more closely toward those who could not afford to pay.30
During the mid-1990s, a major review of universal service in telecommunica-
tions was carried out, inspired partially by the emergence of universal service
concerns at a European level.31  The consultative paper produced by the British
regulator stressed the fundamental role that telecommunications services play
in society and that this role requires that all people, whatever their income or
geographical location, must have access to basic telecommunications facilities.32
Following the universal service review, a new tariff was introduced to provide a
limited service at very low cost, and steps were taken to reduce the level of dis-
connections for non-payment by fifty percent.33  A further review of universal
25. See the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act, 1992 (U.K.).
26. See OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, A BETTER DEAL FOR PAYPHONE USERS (1998)
(visited Nov. 16, 2000) <http://www.oftel.gov.uk/consumer/payp298.htm>.
27. See id.
28. See OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, UNIVERSAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES:
PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN THE UK FROM 1997 (1997) (visited Nov.
16, 2000) <http://www.oftel.gov.uk/consumer/uniserv2/chap1.htm>.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, UNIVERSAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
(1999) (visited Nov. 16, 2000) <http://www.oftel.gov.uk/consumer/uts799.htm>.
33. See id.
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service was initiated in 1999.34  Perhaps the most interesting question raised by
this review is how universal service will develop in the new world of media con-
vergence.  The universal service review had included the provision of enhanced
services for schools and public libraries, but this was pursued separately with
the establishment of a task force to assess the needs of such institutions and to
propose a voluntary scheme for such access.  Such a scheme is now being im-
plemented by the industry and the government with advice from the regulator.35
However, the 1999 consultation on universal service includes the issue of
whether universal service principles should be extended beyond basic voice te-
lephony to include the provision of higher bandwidth to permit fast access to
Internet and other advanced services.
In the gas and electricity industries, the major social concern has been the
disconnection of supply.  In gas, disconnection for failure to pay had been used
widely before privatization; however, disconnections rose immediately after
privatization from 35,626 to 60,778 in 1987.36  Two years later, the regulator an-
nounced a modification of British Gas’s license introducing new procedures
aimed at limiting disconnections.37  The new provisions effectively prevented
disconnection unless the customer had first been offered a pre-payment meter
as an alternative.  The meter allows payment by pre-paid token before con-
sumption and can be set so as to recover debt.  The effect was to reduce discon-
nections radically, with a drop to under 20,000 by 1990 and again to 14,000 in
1995, although by 1998, they had risen again to almost 30,000.38
Similarly, in electricity disconnections were running at the rate of 70,000 per
annum before privatization.  Provisions in the Electricity Act of 1989 and in the
licenses issued to electricity companies prevented disconnection where there is
a serious dispute, and required the issue of a code of practice that largely pre-
cluded disconnection unless a prepayment meter had been offered as an alter-
native.  As a result, disconnections dropped dramatically to below 20,000 in the
year after privatization, and by 1995-96, only 674 domestic customers were dis-
connected for non-payment of bills, with a further fall to around 400 in 1998.39
Despite the recent price increase for gas, this decline in disconnections has pro-
ceeded at a remarkable rate, even if a couple of qualifications must be noted.
First, developments in metering technology played an important part in the de-
cline; and second, the figures hide the extent of “self-disconnection” through
inability to pay with a prepayment meter.40  Further discussion on recent devel-
opments to limit the effects of fuel poverty is given below.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See OFFICE OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS, SOCIAL ACTION PLAN: DISCUSSION
PAPER (May 1999) (visited Nov. 17, 2000) <http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/docs/socialac.pdf>.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. For more information on these issues, see OFFICE OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS,
SOCIAL ACTION PLAN, supra note 36.
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Because the supply of gas and electricity is now competitive, a large number
of new suppliers have entered the market.  There were considerable fears about
the effect of these developments on social obligations.  The first concern related
to the practice of “cream skimming.”  By definition, opening up the market sig-
nalled an end to universal tariffs (which never fully applied to the energy mar-
ket in the United Kingdom anyway).  The fear was that new entrants would of-
fer service only to the most profitable customers, assumed to be the larger
consumers, leaving the poor as an unprofitable remainder retained by the for-
mer monopoly supplier.  Second, it was feared that the social obligations ap-
plying to the monopoly supplier would not apply to competitors.
In gas, a number of strategies have been employed to avoid these problems.
All competing operators have to be licensed, and legislation forbids the grant-
ing of a license that is framed in such a way as to exclude premises likely to be
occupied by persons who are chronically sick, disabled, of pensionable age, or
who are likely to default in the payment of charges.41  This prevents a new sup-
plier from excluding poor inner-city areas from supply, for example.  Licenses
require that all domestic customers in the license area be supplied with gas
without undue preference or undue discrimination in the processing of applica-
tions, thus retaining a type of universal service requirement.42  A dominant sup-
plier also is prohibited from undue preference or undue discrimination in
charges: Price caps will continue to apply to the key British Gas tariffs, includ-
ing the tariff for supply by pre-payment meter, until April 2001 when the mar-
ket is expected to be fully competitive.43  All social requirements in the licenses,
such as the disconnection procedures and special obligations toward old or dis-
abled persons, apply to all suppliers, not just to the former monopolist.  So far,
these provisions have been successful in avoiding the worst of the predicted
problems.  There is evidence that new suppliers are offering deals for all types
of consumers, not just the most profitable ones; however, the lack of innovative
arrangements for savings and for greater reductions in tariffs for prepayment
meter customers has been criticised.44  Provision was also made for a levy on gas
suppliers should any particular supplier be forced to bear an unfair share of the
burden of uneconomic customers; however, this provision has never been used.45
Similar provisions have been introduced for the competitive electricity market,
41. See Gas Act, 1986,  § 7A(8)(b) (U.K.), as amended by Gas Act, 1995 (U.K.).
42. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS., GAS ACT 1995: DETERMINATION OF THE
STANDARD CONDITIONS OF GAS SUPPLIERS’ LICENSES cond. 2(3) (1996).
43. OFFICE OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS, REVIEW OF BRITISH GAS TRADING’S PRICE
REGULATION: FINAL PROPOSALS (Feb. 2000) (visited Nov. 29, 2000) <http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/docs/
pcfeb.pdf>.
44. See NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, GIVING CUSTOMERS A CHOICE: THE INTRODUCTION OF
COMPETITION INTO THE DOMESTIC GAS MARKET, HC 403, 1998-99.
45. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS., supra note 42, cond. 6.
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and price controls are being retained until 2002, although here, there is no pro-
vision for a levy to support high social costs.46  Finally, the Utilities Act 2000
contains new powers permitting the Secretary of State to adjust charges for
electricity and gas to help disadvantaged groups of customers, and these powers
permit the provision of cross-subsidy in their favour, although this is to be used
only as a last resort.47
The story in water and sewerage is in many ways similar, although there has
been no discussion of the introduction of a competitive domestic market.  Con-
troversy has centered mainly around the issue of disconnections.  The health
implications of living without a water supply are, of course, particularly severe,
not just for the disconnected consumer, but for other households that can be af-
fected by disease.  Again, there was a substantial rise in the number of discon-
nections after privatization; by 1991-92 more than 21,000 households were dis-
connected each year.48  In 1992, the regulator issued guidelines to the companies
requiring improved procedures before disconnection took place.49  These proce-
dures resulted in a gradual but substantial drop in the number of disconnections
to 10,000 in 1994-95.50  The introduction of prepayment meters as an alternative
is more difficult to implement for water utilities, although a number of compa-
nies did employ budget payment units that allow use of a card for advance
payment, followed by an emergency credit period of a week.51  However, a court
ruled that these budget payment units were unlawful because they amounted to
disconnection without the statutory protections required by the legislation and
licenses.52  The legislature has recently passed the Water Industry Act of 1999,
which prohibits disconnection of water and sewerage services from residences
for non-payment of charges and also prohibits the use of budget payment units.
The Act also requires charging schemes to be approved by the Director Gen-
eral of Water Services in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary of
State.53  The regulations enable those in vulnerable groups such as those with
three or more dependent children or suffering from specified medical condi-
tions to pay an average charge rather than that based on their metered con-
sumption.54
46. For similar criticisms of the extent of benefits for disadvantaged consumers in the electricity
market, see NATIONAL ELEC. CONSUMERS COUNCIL, ASSISTING DISADVANTAGED CONSUMERS:
PRACTICAL PROPOSALS (1999).
47. See Utilities Act, 2000, §§ 69, 98 (U.K.)
48. See JOHN ERNST, WHOSE UTILITY? THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF PUBLIC UTILITY
PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATION IN BRITAIN 149 (1994).
49. See OFFICE OF WATER SERV., GUIDELINES ON DEBT AND DISCONNECTION (1992).
50. See ALICIA HERBERT & ELAINE KEMPSON, WATER DEBT AND DISCONNECTION 6 (1995).
51. See id. at 69-73.
52. See R v. Director General of Water Services ex parte Oldham MBC, 31 H.L.R. 224 (1998), Case
Note, R v. Director General of Water Services ex p. Oldham MBC, 9 UTIL. L. REV. 123 (1998).
53. See Water Industry Act, 1999, §§ 1-5 (U.K.).
54. The Water Industry (Charges) (Vulnerable Groups) Regulations, S.I. 1999, No. 3441, as
amended by the Water Industry (Charges)(Vulnerable Groups)(Amendment) Regulations, S.I. 2000,
No. 519.
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The protection of universal service in the case of railroads has taken a dif-
ferent path.  For some time, even before privatization, the government had
made separate payments to protect socially necessary but economically ineffi-
cient lines.55  This practice continues today in the form of franchise payments
made to the companies operating rail services.56  Detailed provisions limit serv-
ice closures and protect a minimum level of service.57  Historically, the proce-
dures governing passenger service closures have been under public control, and
in the past, closure hearings have been prolonged and controversial.58  When
there are objections to a proposed station or line closure, a regional committee
must hold a hearing to investigate whether the closure will cause hardship.  The
committee reports its findings to the regulator, who then determines whether
the closure will cause hardship and decides whether it will take effect.59  The de-
cision may be appealed to the minister, although the Transport Bill before the
Parliament at the time of writing proposes that the decision be that of the minis-
ter rather than that of the regulator in all cases.60  No rail closures of any impor-
tance have taken place since privatization, because of their political unpopular-
ity, although the future position of rail closures after franchises have been
renewed is less certain.61  The franchise agreements also incorporate minimum
service requirements on lines protecting potentially unprofitable services such
as late evening trains.62
I do not wish to suggest that these somewhat particularistic attempts to pre-
vent the exploitation of more vulnerable consumers are necessarily satisfactory.
As mentioned above, in the competitive energy markets, a number of sources
have expressed concern that, although poor families have gained, they have
gained less than the more prosperous.63  The major change in this area, however,
is from consumer protection depending on the goodwill of an industry (or on
very ineffective political mechanisms) to rules enforceable by regulators, nor-
mally taking the form of license conditions under which enterprises operate or
codes of practice required by license conditions.  Indeed, under public owner-
ship, the interests of government and the enterprise could often coincide at the
expense of the consumer.  For example, raising energy prices and requiring the
proceeds to be paid to the government through repayment of debt or as a direct
levy may be used as a form of highly regressive surrogate taxation without the
55. See Transport Act, 1968, §§ 38-40 (U.K.).
56. See Railways Act, 1993, §§ 23-31 (U.K.).
57. See id. §§ 37-50.
58. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 12, at 165-68.
59. See Railways Act, 1993, § 43 (U.K.).
60. See id. § 44.
61. For a decision by the courts preventing evasion of these procedures, see Highland Regional
Council v. British Railways Board, 1996 SLT 274 (1st Div.).
62. For a successful challenge to the first version of the requirements, see R v. Director of Passen-
ger Rail Franchising, ex parte Save Our Railways, TIMES (London), Dec. 18, 1995 (C.A.).
63. See, e.g., NATIONAL ELEC. CONSUMERS COUNCIL, supra note 46.
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inconvenience of passing legislation.64  Although at the time of privatization
there was a similar identity of interests between the government (which wanted
to sell shares successfully) and industries (which wanted to be privatized on fa-
vourable terms in the later operation of the regulated utilities), the role of the
regulators has brought questions about the best arrangements for protecting
disadvantaged consumers far more into the open.  Indeed, privatization has re-
moved the direct incentive of government as owner to maximize industry re-
turns.  The creation of a network of independent regulators has brought to the
forefront the question of how extensively constraints should be imposed on
profit-maximization by utility enterprises.  These constraints have been im-
posed by law, normally in the form of provisions in the licenses of the utility en-
terprises, rather than by informal and secretive intervention.  The creation of
independent regulators was originally viewed as a way of increasing investor
confidence by preventing arbitrary intervention by governments after privatiza-
tion.  Paradoxically, however, it has formed the most important basis for the
creation of an emerging body of public service law.
IV
REGULATORY AGENCIES AND REGULATORY REFORM
Two conclusions should be apparent from the description of the process of
privatization in the United Kingdom.  First, the utility regulators have not lim-
ited themselves to economic regulation; at times, they act for social reasons.
Second, there is no coherent pattern to this; the interventions have been some-
what pragmatic and have differed from utility to utility.  One problem hamper-
ing their efforts has been the concern that social interventions by regulators are
undemocratic.  Some argue that the regulator should be restricted to applying
economic criteria with the aim of maximizing efficiency.  Social goals, by con-
trast, should be left to government which, unlike the regulators, has a demo-
cratic mandate.65  This view was shared to a degree by some of the utility regula-
tors.  For example, the former Director of Gas Supply refused to support
energy-saving measures by levying a charge on consumers because she consid-
ered that to be a matter for the government and for Parliament to decide.66
Currently, however, measures are under consideration to create a clearer divi-
sion of responsibilities through the current process of regulatory reform.
The Labour Government elected in 1997 has been more sympathetic to the
potential need for social regulation than its predecessors: “Ensuring that the
services provided by [the utilities] are available to all members of society, in-
cluding the most vulnerable, on fair terms, is important to the Government’s
64. For additional examples of this, see PROSSER, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES supra note 12, at
63-69.
65. See FOSTER, supra note 2, at 316-23.
66. See PROSSER, supra note 18, at 110-13.
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wider objective of creating a fairer society.”67  The question of how to create a
more orderly set of arrangements for public access to utilities was a central aim
of the review of utility regulation carried out in 1998 which resulted in the Utili-
ties Act 2000.68  The review concluded that “the Government, not regulators,
should determine the social objectives of regulation,” and proposed a new ap-
proach under which the government will issue statutory guidance to regulators
in each sector.69  However, where new measures with significant financial impli-
cations are to be imposed, new primary legislation will be passed, rather than
using regulatory guidance.  For example, regarding the controversial question
of energy efficiency levies on consumers, the government has stated that new
standards of performance to deliver energy and carbon savings through the es-
tablishment of energy saving schemes funded by a levy “would fall into the
category of measures which should be implemented through new specific legal
provision rather than relying on guidance to the regulator.”70  The new Act in-
deed includes specific powers to set efficiency standards by government.71
In one respect the Utilities Act 2000 has been a major disappointment in
that during Parliamentary proceedings, the government decided to limit its ap-
plicability to the energy utilities (electricity and gas); telecommunications and
water will thus wait for possible reform of regulation some time in the future.72
Nevertheless, some important changes relating to social regulation have been
included.  Thus the energy regulator will have a duty to heed guidance issued by
the minister on social and environmental matters.73
Existing duties respecting the elderly, the disabled, and those in rural areas
are retained, and new duties regarding the interests of low-income consumers
and the chronically sick have been introduced.74  In place of the somewhat in-
consistent and opaque duties applying to each regulator under the original util-
ity statues, the Act gives the new energy regulator a single new overriding
duty.75  This duty will require it
to protect the interests of consumers, wherever possible and appropriate, through
promoting effective competition.  The interests of consumers should be interpreted to
67. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS., A FAIR DEAL FOR CONSUMERS: THE RESPONSE
TO CONSULTATION 1998.
68. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS., A FAIR DEAL FOR CONSUMERS: MODERNISING
THE FRAMEWORK FOR UTILITY REGULATION, 1998, Cmnd. 3898; the final proposals are in the
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS., supra note 67.
69. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS., supra note 68,  2.13-18, 5.4; DEPARTMENT OF
TRADE AND INDUS., supra note 67, 10-14, at 57-62.
70. DEPARTMENT OF THE ENV’T, TRANSPORT AND THE REGIONS, UK CLIMATE CHANGE
PROGRAMME, 1998,  66.
71. See Utilities Act, 2000, §§ 70, 99 (U.K.).
72. See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY, PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) cols. 555-
60 (2000).
73. See Utilities Act, 2000, §§ 70, 99 (U.K.).
74. See Utilities Act, 2000, § 9 (U.K.) (adding a new § 4(AA)(3) to the Gas Act, 1986 (U.K.)), § 13
(adding a new § 3(A)(3) to the Electricity Act, 1989 (U.K.)); DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS.,
supra note 67, ¶ 13;.
75. See Utilities Act, 2000, § 9 (adding a new § 4(AA)(1) to the Gas Act, 1986 (U.K.), § 13 (adding
a new § 3(A)(1) to the Electricity Act, 1989 (U.K.)).
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include prices and conditions of supply, continuity and availability of supply, quality of
supply, and, where relevant, the range of services offered.  In defining the interests of
consumers, due weight should be given to their long-term and medium-term interests
as well as to their immediate or short-term interests.76
Although the importance of competition is explicitly addressed, the other mat-
ters mentioned clearly permit the energy regulator to take social considerations
into account; indeed, the duty to comply with social and environmental guid-
ance from ministers requires this.  The reforms also envisage the creation of a
more effective and independent form of consumer representation in relation to
the utilities.  Based on past experience, this will provide a channel for the con-
tinual monitoring of industry performance in relation to social concerns.77
In addition to the legislative reform, the Government also asked the energy
regulators to draw up an action plan to ensure that disadvantaged customers
benefit from the advantages of opening up the gas and electricity markets to
competition.78  The plan confirmed that measures had already been taken to
protect such consumers, and that in the case of gas, research had shown that the
proportion of customers changing to new suppliers was, in general, evenly dis-
tributed across all social groups.  As mentioned above, however, the National
Audit Office and others have expressed some concern that disadvantaged con-
sumers have not benefited as much as others.79  A remaining issue was the
higher charges paid by prepayment meter customers.  Some steps had been
taken to reduce these prepayment charges, and other alterations in the charging
system emerged as possibilities to benefit such customers.80  The first version of
the action plan, however, did little more than to restate the existing arrange-
ments to protect vulnerable consumers in the liberalized markets described
above.  After criticism, a revised draft was considerably more far-reaching, in-
cluding proposals both for more detailed research and the strengthening of the
obligations imposed on energy supply companies. For example, companies
would be required to accept more frequent cash payments and to accept im-
proved codes of practice on pre-payment meters, and to charge a binding
maximum fee for the permitted surcharge payable by customers for the use of
such meters.  These reforms have now been implemented.81
The move toward legally enforceable public service requirements has cul-
minated in the plan announced in the summer of 1999 for reform of the Post
Office implemented by the Postal Services Act 2000.82  A new regulatory com-
76. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS., supra note 67,  16.
77. Id.  17-21; see also Utilities Act, 2000, § 2 (U.K.) & sched. 2.
78. See OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION & OFFICE OF GAS SUPPLY, THE SOCIAL
DIMENSION: ACTION PLAN 2 (1998).
79. See NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 44.
80. See OFFICE OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS, SOCIAL ACTION PLAN: A FRAMEWORK
DOCUMENT 21 (Oct. 1999) (visited Nov. 21, 2000) <http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/docs/social.pdf>.
81. See id.; OFFICE OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS, SOCIAL ACTION PLAN (Mar. 2000)
(visited Nov. 21, 2000) <http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/docs/sapmarch.pdf>; OFFICE OF GAS AND
ELECTRICITY MARKETS, SOCIAL ACTION PLAN: ENHANCING SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS: A PROPOSALS
DOCUMENT (visited Nov. 21, 2000) (Jan. 2000) <http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/docs/socjan.pdf>.
82. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS., supra note 21.
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mission has been created, and its primary duty is to maintain universal postal
delivery service throughout the United Kingdom at a uniform tariff.  This duty
is enshrined and defined in law for the first time.83  Minimum criteria will also be
set for access to services, such as the protection of rural post offices, and prog-
ress toward those goals will be monitored by the new regulator.84  Even before
the passage of the Postal Services Act, the universal service obligation was ini-
tially set out in regulations implementing the European Community Postal
Services Directive.85  As this example suggests, the long tradition of public serv-
ice law in other European Community countries, such as France, is beginning to
have a profound effect on the United Kingdom through E.C. law, and I shall
now describe the French tradition before dealing with E.C. law in more detail.
V
PUBLIC SERVICE IN FRANCE
So far, I have described the domestic British influences that have resulted in
the development of a new public service law in relation to utility services.
These influences have included the institution of regulators independent from
government and private enterprise, the failure to limit the statutory duties of
the regulators to economic matters, and a more sympathetic attitude from the
new Labour Government to social regulation in general.  In addition, other
Member States in the European Union, most notably France, have a tradition
of protecting public service that is radically different from that of the United
Kingdom.  In the past this tradition had minimal effect on the United Kingdom,
where political rather than legal protections were seen as the most appropriate
way of ensuring that public service goals were protected.  However, the Conti-
nental model has now begun to have an important influence due to the United
Kingdom’s membership in the European Union and the effect of E.C. law.  It is
thus essential to examine the protection of public service in other Member
States, and France provides by far the most developed example.86
In France, the concept of public service has its roots in the Constitution.
The Preamble to the 1946 Constitution includes a provision to the effect that
“[a]ll property and enterprises of which the running has, or acquires, the charac-
ter of a national public service or a de facto monopoly are to become public
property.”87  There has been some doubt about the meaning of this provision,
and it has been interpreted broadly by the Conseil Constitutionnel.88  Notably, it
83. See Postal Services Act, 2000, §§ 1-5 (U.K.).
84. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS., supra note 21, chs. 4, 7.
85. See Postal Services Regulations, 1999, S.I. 2107.
86. For a more general discussion of public service in the European Union, see PUBLIC SERVICES
AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW, supra note 3.
87. LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958, preamble (Preamble to Constitution, 1946)
(amended 1992) (Fr.).
88. Notably in the Privatizations decision, see Conseil constitutionnel (Cons. const.), June 25-26,
1986, C.C. 207, 1986, No. 86-207 DC (visited Nov. 16, 2000) <http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/1986 /86207dc.htm>.
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does not apply to local public services such as water, which has for some time
largely been supplied by private companies operating under concession.
The concept of service public is much more fully developed in French ad-
ministrative law than in British law.89  It can be summarized as follows: “In
French public law, public service is an activity in the general interest, provided
by a public or private actor and subject to a special legal regime requiring
equality of treatment, adaptation to changing needs and security of supply,
etc.”90 The principle of public service has been implemented in two ways:
through public ownership and through the granting of public service conces-
sions for private concerns.  Indeed, concessions also have been used to set out a
framework for the operation of public enterprises.  In much of the rhetoric con-
cerning public service, an intrinsic interdependence of three elements has been
assumed: (1) public service defined in law; (2) public ownership; and (3) a pub-
lic monopoly to enable the distinctive tasks of public service to be achieved.  It
is important to point out, however, that in legal terms at least, service public is
not synonymous with public ownership, or even with the granting of monopoly
rights.  Service public may also be a means of incorporating certain social prin-
ciples into the operation of private enterprises in the market place; this is likely
to be its most important role in the future.91  It is also important to note that
service public is essentially non-economic and distributive in nature: “It is the
essence of service public, as a means of consolidation of the social contract and
of social solidarity, that it contributes to some types of redistribution and of
transfers between social groups.”92
What are the actual requirements of a regime of service public?  The basic
requirement is that of equality, ensuring equal access to services and equal
treatment of consumers unless there is good reason not to do so.  This may re-
sult in a rule prohibiting arbitrary pricing distinctions or restrictive access condi-
tions.  Other principles of equality include continuity of public service, which
has most often concerned the extent of a right to strike on the part of public sec-
tor workers.  Equality may also require security of supply, a key issue in energy
liberalization.  Service public also requires political neutrality in the provision of
services.  Echoing concerns in Anglo-Saxon utilities regulation, the participa-
tion of consumers in the administration, or at least in the regulation of services,
as well as transparency of administration also have become part of the require-
89. For a comprehensive overview, see PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN UNION
LAW, supra note 3.  There is a vast and fast-growing French literature on the subject.
90. Marc Debène & Olivier Raymundie, Sur Le Service Universel: Renouveau Du Service Public ou
Nouvelle Mystification? 52:3 AJDA 183, 186 (1996).  My translation is a loose one in view of the diffi-
culty in conveying the flavour of the concept in English.
91. See CONSEIL D’ETAT, supra note 3, at 26-29.  The point has been re-emphasised in the decision
of the Conseil constitutionnel concerning the partial privatization of France Télécom.  See Cons.
Const., July 23, 1996, R.J.C. 1996, No. 96-380DC (visited Nov. 16, 2000) <http: www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/1996/96380dc.htm>.  The issue has also been addressed in the recent and in-
fluential report to the Prime Minister by an official Commission on Public Service.  See DENOIX DE
SAINT MARC, supra note 3, at 17, 43, 77-78.
92. See CONSEIL D’ETAT, supra note 3, at 53 (author’s translation).
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ments of a service public regime.93  These basic requirements are central princi-
ples of French administrative law but are implemented and supplemented by
extensive statutory and regulatory requirements.94  Though it is outside the
scope of this article, the concept of service public has also played a major role in
the regulation of broadcasting in France, particularly its attempts to defend
public service broadcasting within the European Union and in relation to the
GATT cultural exception.95
VI
CONFLICTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION OVER THE NEW CONCEPT OF
PUBLIC SERVICE
Because of the differing degrees of legal protection of public services in the
Member States of the European Union, there have been fierce conflicts within
the European Union as to the degree to which public utility markets should be
opened to competition.96  The U.K. model of liberalization is often presented as
a threat to the values of public service, while France’s model is seen in the An-
glo-Saxon world as protecting inefficient state enterprises through a system of
special privileges.
In fact, both models find support in E.C. law.  Thus, Articles 81 and 82 of
the Treaty establishing the European Community97 set out the basic principles
of competition law that are made applicable to public enterprises by Article
86(1).98  The rapid process of liberalizing the telecommunications industry, the
first example of utility liberalization, took place through a model of utilities de-
tached from direct government control and working in competitive markets.99
Universal service remains a value to be protected by specific interventions
within the competitive marketplace, rather than by any overall regime of public
service.100  Similar assumptions can be found in the arrangements adopted for the
liberalization of civil aviation and, subject to greater qualification, electricity
93. All these principles are analysed in detail in id.
94. For an illustration of the application of public service principles to the French postal service,
see Case T-106/95, Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurances (FFSA) v. Commission of the
European Communities, 1997 E.C.R. II-229.
95. See Philip Schlesinger, From Cultural Defense to Political Culture: Media, Politics and Collec-
tive Identity in the European Union, 19 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 369 (1997).
96. See, e.g., Services of General Interest in Europe, COM(96)443 final.
97. Formerly articles 85 and 86; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7,
1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter E.C. TREATY].
98. Formerly article 90(1), E.C. TREATY.
99. For a good summary of the early stages of this process, see A. Hunt, Regulation of Telecommu-
nications: The Developing EU Regulatory Framework and its Impact on the United Kingdom, 3
EUROPEAN PUB. LAW 93 (1997).
100. See, e.g., Developing Universal Service For Telecommunications in a Competitive Environ-
ment, COM(93)159 final; European Parliament and Council Directive 98/10/EC on the Application of
Open Network Provision to Voice Telephony and on Universal Service For Telecommunications in a
Competitive Environment, 1998 O.J. (L 101) 1.4.  For an outstanding critical discussion, see Wolf Sau-
ter, Universal Service Obligations and the Emergence of Citizens’ Rights in European Telecommunica-
tions Liberalization, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW, supra note 3,
at 117.
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and gas.  With regard to the structures of enterprises to be adopted in the fu-
ture, Article 295 of the Treaty101 apparently preserves neutrality between differ-
ent forms of property ownership—in other words, whether an enterprise is
publicly or privately owned.  However, there is no doubt that state aid policies
have been a major contributing factor to privatization throughout the European
Union, as they require that public enterprises be treated no differently from en-
terprises that are privately owned.102  Thus, what is the point of keeping enter-
prises public if they cannot be subject to a different regime?  While this point
must be qualified for the utilities, the notion in other cases has been important
in shaping policy on privatization.  Moreover, jurisprudence from the European
Court of Justice has restricted or ended certain special privileges of public utili-
ties.  For example, one decision limited the ability of British Telecom to act
anti-competitively even before it became privatized.103  The Commission’s sup-
port for this model of utilities operating in a competitive marketplace with a re-
sidual role for universal service has led to sustained criticism from Continental
Member States.  These states claim that the Commission is “a liberalisation ma-
chine, ultra-liberal and dogmatic.”104  In other words, it is alleged that the Com-
mission has ignored the broader conception of public service.
On the other hand, the French-based model of public service has also had an
important place within E.C. law.  Thus, Article 86(1), applying the competition
principles to public enterprises, is immediately qualified by the following sub-
article that provides a limited defense against their application in the case of
“services of general economic interest,” in order that their application does not
obstruct the performance of the tasks entrusted to bodies providing such serv-
ices.105  The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice also indicates an ac-
ceptance of the legitimate role of public service.  For example, in the well-
known case of Corbeau, the Court accepted that the normal principles of E.C.
competition law could be limited to permit the conferring of exclusive rights on
a state monopoly to the extent necessary to preserve a universal service through
cross-subsidy.106  Similarly, in the Almelo decision, the Court specified that the
competition rules could be modified if necessary to ensure a continued supply
of electricity on demand to all types of consumers on the basis of uniform tariffs
and non-discriminatory conditions throughout the areas covered by their
101. Formerly Article 222.
102. See Commission of the European Communities, Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy
(1985), point 198; Case C234/84, Belgium v. Commission of European Communities, 1986 E.C.R. 2263,
[1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 331,  13 (1986).  The largest and most controversial example has been that of state
aid to Crédit Lyonnais.  See Commission Decision 98/490/EC of 20 May 1998 Concerning Aid Granted
By France to the Crédit Lyonnais Group, 1998 O.J. (L 221) 28.
103. See Case C41/83, Italy v. Commission of European Communities, 1985 E.C.R. 873, [1985] 2
C.M.L.R. 368 (1985).
104. See Karel Van Miert, L’Europe, Vecteur De La Libéralisation, Speech, Paris, France (Oct. 21,
1996).
105. Formerly article 90(1), E.C. TREATY.
106. See Case C-320/91, Regie des Postes v. Corbeau, 1993 E.C.R. I-2533, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 621
(1993).
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authorizations.107  In early 1997, the Court of First Instance rejected a challenge
to the way in which the French postal service had been compensated for its
public service obligations, confirming the discretion given to Member States in
arranging such compensation.  Furthermore, the court found that support per-
mitted under Article 86(2) would not constitute unlawful state aid.108
During the period preceding the Amsterdam Inter-Governmental Confer-
ence, which determined important reforms to the treaties on which the Euro-
pean Union is based, the European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participa-
tion and other pressure groups campaigning on behalf of public enterprises led
a vociferous campaign in favor of the amendment of the treaty in a way that
would have seriously weakened the application of Article 86(1).  The proposed
amendment would permit the Member States to decide which activities would
form part of “services of general economic interest.”  The French and Belgian
governments also proposed treaty amendments to guarantee universal rights of
access to such services.109  The European Parliament passed a resolution stating
that the “fundamental principles of public service, i.e. accessibility, universality,
equality, continuity, quality, transparency and participation in the context of the
single market and respecting the principle of subsidiarity, should be incorpo-
rated in the Treaty.”110  The Commission itself made much more limited propos-
als for the addition of “a contribution to the promotion of services of general
interest” to the list of Community activities in the treaty.111  There was consider-
able political division within the Conference between the Member States fa-
voring such an amendment and those, including the United Kingdom, who be-
lieved that current treaty provisions ensured an adequate balance between
competition policy and the needs of a public service.  What was eventually
agreed upon was a French-inspired amendment to add a new Article 16 to the
treaty as follows:
Without prejudice to Articles 77, 90 and 92, and given the place occupied by services
of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in
promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Community and the Member States,
each within their respective powers and within the scope of application of this Treaty,
shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions
which enable them to fulfil their missions.112
107. See Case C-393/92, Almelo v. Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij NV, 1994 E.C.R. I-1477; see also Case C-
157/94, Commission of European Communities v. Netherlands, 1997 E.C.R. I-5699.
108. See Case T-106/95, Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurances (FFSA) v. Commission of
the European Communities, 1997 E.C.R. II-229.
109. See, e.g., CENTRE EUROPÉEN À PARTICIPATION PUBLIQUE, EUROPE, CONCURRENCE ET
SERVICE PUBLIC (1995); European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation (CEEP), Europe,
Competition and Public Service (Apr. 17, 1996) (press release).
110. Resolution of the European Parliament on the Intergovernmental Conference, 1996 O.J. (C
96) 77.
111. Communication from the Commission—Services of General Interest in Europe, COM(96)443
final.
112. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J.
(C 340) 16 (1997).
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A Declaration stated that these provisions should be implemented “with full re-
spect for the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, inter alia as regards the prin-
ciples of equality of treatment, quality and continuity of such services.”113  Other
amendments aim to protect public service broadcasting.114  It has yet to be seen
whether these amendments have more than symbolic importance, but even if
their practical effect is limited, they represent a fuller recognition of the role of
public service in the basic principles of European law.  Indeed, it has been ar-
gued strongly that they go much further than the merely symbolic, and provide
a new concept of public service to promote cohesion and shared values, which
must be respected by Member States.115
The more important practical development has been the emergence of more
detailed principles in particular areas of liberalization.  As mentioned above,
this trend has reached its most advanced stage in the telecommunications indus-
try.116  Here, the dominant Continental model was that of a monopoly public en-
terprise which would be expected to deliver public service objectives; in prac-
tice, however, even legal requirements of public service often were not
fulfilled.117  This model has been succeeded by full telecommunications liberali-
zation as a result of community action.  Built into this liberalization have been
requirements of universal service that go considerably farther than earlier re-
quirements in guaranteeing a basic minimum standard and other service stan-
dards which may develop beyond basic telephony.  As one commentator has
put it, “[t]he paradoxical result may well turn out to be that true universal serv-
ice will for the first time be available throughout the European Union after lib-
eralisation has been completed.”118
The European dimension has also had an important influence on the U.K.
telecommunications universal service measures discussed above.  The impact of
E.U. policies in the United Kingdom is becoming apparent in the area of postal
services, where, as part of an internal market, Community law requires a de-
fined universal service obligation, which sets criteria for defining the monopoly
services necessary for maintaining universal service, and maintains prices that
are affordable, geared to costs, and non-discriminatory.  It also requires the set-
ting and publication of service standards and the establishment of a national
regulatory authority separate from the public postal operator.119  These policies
113. Id. art. 2(8), Declaration on Article 7d of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
The numbering quoted refers to the old numbers of the Treaty Articles; the new equivalents to arts. 77,
90, and 92 are arts. 73, 86, and 87.
114. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, Protocol on the System of Public Service Broadcasting in the
Member States, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 109.
115. Malcolm Ross, Article 16 E.C. and Services of General Interest: From Derogation to Obliga-
tion?, 25 EUR. L. REV. 22 (2000).
116. See Sauter, supra note 100, at 122-23, 133.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 142; see also Universal Service For Telecommunications in the Perspective of a Fully Lib-
eralised Environment, COM(96)73.
119. See Directive 97/67/EC on Common Rules For the Development of the Internal Market of
Community Postal Services and the Improvement of Quality of Service, 1998 O.J. (L 15) 14.
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were indeed introduced into the United Kingdom as a result of E.C. obligations
before the implementation of fuller postal reforms.
The relationship between the open-ended legal concept of public service
and the more limited concept of universal service as an exception to a presump-
tion in favor of competitive markets remains the subject of considerable debate,
especially in France.  The more limited concept of universal service has pre-
vailed in the European Union.120  It is possible, however, that the practical dif-
ferences between the two are relatively small.  Moreover, particularly in the
field of telecommunications, Continental concerns preserving the public service
tradition have influenced the evolution of E.C. law.  These concerns, in turn,
have provided reasons for moderating, on social grounds, the free play of mar-
ket competition in the operation of the U.K. utilities.  Nor has the traffic been
only one way, for there have been examples of the Anglo-Saxon model influ-
encing countries with a strong public service tradition.  Apart from the exten-
sive adoption of independent regulatory commissions,121 more specific examples
include France’s adoption of a Charter of Public Services in 1992 in an attempt
to spell out the requirements of public service in greater detail.  This charter is
analogous to the U.K. practice of using service standards.122  Italy also adopted a
law on the delivery of public services in 1994, which sets out fundamental prin-
ciples of public service based on the French model.  Those principles, however,
will be implemented by service standards similar to British practice.123
VII
CONCLUSION
What has occurred in the United Kingdom is thus a move toward the devel-
opment of a body of legal doctrine closer to the concept of public service en-
shrined in other European legal systems.  I do not wish to argue that this is a di-
rect result of privatization itself.  Rather, it has been due largely to the creation
of regulators independent of government and enterprise, thus making some le-
gal framework to structure relations inevitable.124
It is, of course, not impossible that such a regime could exist while retaining
public ownership.  Indeed, in the United Kingdom, postal services, and in Scot-
land, water and sewerage, are subject to independent regulation while remain-
120. See, e.g., P. Barbet and A. Gonzalez, La Notion de Service Universel dans les Télécommunica-
tions, LXIII REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 59 (1999); John Bell, The Concept of
Public Service Under Threat?  An Illustration from Energy Law, 5 EUROPEAN PUB. L. 189 (1999).
121. See Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of Statutory Regulation in Europe, in REGULATING
EUROPE 47 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1996).
122. See M. Bechtel et al., Chronique de l’Administration, 62 REVUE FRANÇAISE
D’ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 335, 337 (1992).
123. See Direttiva del Presidente del Consiglio de Ministri, Jan. 27, 1994, Gazzetta Ufficiale della
Republica Italiana, n. 43 (Feb. 22, 1994).
124. This is the major difference from New Zealand, where such regulatory arrangements were not
established.
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ing under public ownership.125  Indeed, it may be that publicly owned enterprise
is necessary to establish the infrastructure for universal service, though not nec-
essarily for its operation.
The second major influence has come about through Britain’s membership
in the European Union.  Again, while pressing for the opening of utility mar-
kets to competition (though not always requiring privatization), the European
Union has fostered the separation of regulation from operation of the enter-
prise, thereby making a legal framework necessary.  Continental public service
concerns have infiltrated this liberalization, requiring clearer legal definitions of
limitations on the operation of the free market undertaken on distributive
grounds.
In the United Kingdom, the new public service law is not mainly adminis-
tered by the courts, but by the regulatory bodies themselves.  This has advan-
tages such as the avoidance of damaging litigation while retaining the courts as
adjudicators in cases of real difficulty.  It is clear that we are now seeing the be-
ginning of the replacement of ineffective political controls over public enter-
prise by legal principles that include elements of social solidarity and rights of
access to essential services.126  Privatization in the United Kingdom has given
birth to some unexpected offspring.
125. The example of the Post Office is discussed in detail supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text;
see DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS., supra note 21.  For the new arrangements for water and
sewerage services in Scotland, see the Water Industry Act, 1999, §§ 12-13, sched. 2.
126. This argument is made at greater length in Tony Prosser, Theorising Utility Regulation, 62
MODERN  L. REV. 196 (1999).
